Articles

In their recenty published article "Obscured Transparency? Compensation Benchmarking and the Biasing of Executive Pay," Prof. Di Prete and Benjamin Elbers, together with co-author Mathijs De Vaan (UC, Berkeley, find that firms select peer groups strategically in order to justify higher pay for the CEO and that upward bias in compensation peer groups is highly predictive of an increase in CEO compensation.

In their recenlty published ASR article, School-to-Work Linkages, Education Mismatches, and Labor Market Outcomes, Prof. DiPrete, Christina Ciocca, and co-authors Thijs Bol and Herman G. van de Werfhorst, find that workers have higher earnings when they are in occupations that match their educational level and field of study, but the size of this earnings boost depends on the clarity and strength of the pathway between their educational credential and the labor market.