Research Seed Grant | 2008-2009
Cooperation by Design? Uncertainty, Context and International Agreements
by Tonya Putnam (Department of Political Science)
Why do international agreements vary so widely in their design? Prior scholarship on rational design looks to the strategic problems agreements are intended to resolve for answers to this question. It does so, however, by examining individual agreements in largely atomistic terms. This project begins with the observation that international treaties are negotiated against a backdrop of prior agreements and institutions. Our central hypothesis is that “context”—by which we mean the existing legal and institutional environment in which states negotiate whether and on what terms to enter into international treaties—heavily influence states’ choices about agreement design. Incorporating contextual variables into models that purport to explain the origins, form, and operation of international agreements will enable clearer specification of various dimensions of uncertainty that generate the particular outcomes of interest. Our preliminary work suggests a need for substantial revisions to conventional IR accounts of international cooperation (and its absence). Gaining a better grasp of the conditions under which governments decide to create or transform the agreements that govern their interactions with one another is, furthermore, relevant to ongoing policy debates over the effects—and the effectiveness—of international institutions.Why do international agreements vary so widely in their design? Prior scholarship on rational design looks to the strategic problems agreements are intended to resolve for answers to this question. It does so, however, by examining individual agreements in largely atomistic terms. This project begins with the observation that international treaties are negotiated against a backdrop of prior agreements and institutions. Our central hypothesis is that “context”—by which we mean the existing legal and institutional environment in which states negotiate whether and on what terms to enter into international treaties—heavily influence states’ choices about agreement design. Incorporating contextual variables into models that purport to explain the origins, form, and operation of international agreements will enable clearer specification of various dimensions of uncertainty that generate the particular outcomes of interest. Our preliminary work suggests a need for substantial revisions to conventional IR accounts of international cooperation (and its absence). Gaining a better grasp of the conditions under which governments decide to create or transform the agreements that govern their interactions with one another is, furthermore, relevant to ongoing policy debates over the effects—and the effectiveness—of international institutions.
