Research Seed Grant | 2005-2006

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Institutions, Personal Votes, and the Incumbency Advantage in Japan and the United States

by Shigeo Hirano

This project examines the relationship between institutions and candidate-centered democracy. A large part of the project will involve creating new databases of electoral results and candidate characteristics from both Japan and the United States during the period 1900 to the present. Using this new dataset, the project will answer questions such what are the relationships between particular institutional arrangements and patterns of candidate-centered voting? Why do some candidate-centered democracies, such as the U.S., have large incumbency advantages, while other candidate-centered democracies, such as Japan, do not? What are some of the welfare implications for having particular types of institutional arrangements?

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